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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Metacognitive Monitoring and Control of Eyewitness Memory Reports
in Autism
Katie Maras , Jade Eloise Norris, and Neil Brewer
Providing eyewitness testimony involves monitoring one’s memory to provide a detailed and accurate account: reporting
details likely to be accurate and withholding potentially inaccurate details. Autistic individuals reportedly experience dif-
ficulties in both retrieving episodic memories and monitoring their accuracy, which has important implications for eye-
witness testimony. Thirty autistic and 33 IQ-matched typically developing (TD) participants viewed a video of a mock
bank robbery followed by three phases of questions (with judgments of confidence). In Phase 1, participants freely gener-
ated the granularity of their responses (i.e., fine- or coarse-grained). In Phase 2, participants answered the same questions
but provided both a fine- and a coarse-grained answer. In Phase 3, participants were instructed to maximize accuracy over
informativeness by selecting one of their Phase 2 answers as their final answer. They either received the questions socially
(from the experimenter) or answered them online. There were no group differences in accuracy or metacognitive moni-
toring, with both autistic and TD witnesses demonstrating: (a) a strong preference for reporting fine-grained details at the
expense of accuracy; (b) improved though still suboptimal grain size reporting when instructed to maximize accuracy
over informativeness; (c) effective accuracy monitoring; and (d) higher overall accuracy when questions were delivered
socially. There was, however, a subtle difference in metacognitive control, with autistic witnesses performing more poorly
than TD witnesses when questions were delivered socially, but not when they were delivered online. These findings con-
trast with evidence suggesting that autism is marked by impairments in episodic memory and metacognitive monitoring
and control. Autism Res 2020, 00: 1–13. © 2020 The Authors. Autism Research published by International Society for Autism
Research published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Lay Summary: Autistic people have been reported to experience subtle difficulties in monitoring and regulating their
information reporting, which has important implications for providing eyewitness testimony. We found that autistic wit-
nesses’ testimony comprised a similar level of detail and accuracy as non-autistic witnesses’ accounts. However, autistic
people found it difficult to optimize their testimony when the questions were delivered socially—but not when they
answered the questions online.
Keywords: autism; memory; interviewing; support; witness; grain size; metacognition; monitoring
Introduction
Recalling information from memory involves monitoring
output for informativeness (to provide as much detailed
information as possible) and accuracy (to avoid reporting
incorrect information). According to Koriat and Gold-
smith’s [1996] monitoring and control framework, when
responding to questions, an individual first attempts to
retrieve a fine-grained (FG) (i.e., detailed) response. Confi-
dence in the accuracy of this detail is then evaluated and
compared with a criterion value. A typical individual will
volunteer a FG response (e.g., “navy blue” in response to
“what color was his hat?”) when their confidence exceeds
this criterion and if not, the individual attempts to
retrieve a less detailed, coarse-grained (CG) response [e.-
g., “dark”; Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008]. This process of
memory monitoring and control has important implica-
tions for eyewitness testimony, where it is crucial to max-
imize the amount of information witnesses provide while
also ensuring accuracy. Importantly, it also suggests that
the compromise between accuracy and informativeness is
under the strategic control of the witness, rather than
simply a result of memory encoding or maintenance pro-
cesses [Weber & Brewer, 2008].
There is now a large body of evidence showing that,
alongside the core behavioral features of autism, autistic
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individuals show marked differences in memory pro-
cesses compared to typically developing (TD) individuals
[see e.g., Boucher & Bowler, 2008; Boucher, Mayes, & Big-
ham, 2012]. In particular, autistic individuals often expe-
rience specific difficulties in retrieving episodic memories
[see e.g., Crane & Maras, 2018; Gaigg & Bowler, 2018]. A
number of studies also report that autistic individuals
show difficulties in monitoring the accuracy of their
responses [e.g., Brosnan et al., 2016; Grainger, Williams, &
Lind, 2014, 2016; Williams, Bergström, & Grainger, 2018;
but see Sawyer, Williamson, & Young, 2014, and Wojcik,
Allen, Brown, & Souchay, 2011]. Given that monitoring
is used to regulate or “control” reporting choices [Koriat &
Goldsmith, 1996], it is plausible that difficulties with
metacognitive monitoring play a key role in the reported
difficulties in autistic people’s strategic reporting of epi-
sodic information. However, little research to date has
examined metacognitive control in autism, and none to
our knowledge has specifically tested this in the context
of memory for episodic events.
Grainger et al. [2016] examined autistic and TD chil-
dren’s monitoring and control processes on a general
knowledge task. To test metacognitive monitoring, partic-
ipants provided “judgments of confidence” (also known
as “realism of confidence judgments”) in their answers to
questions about recently studied material. To test meta-
cognitive control, participants were told that for each cor-
rect answer, they would receive a point, but for each
incorrect answer, they would lose a point, and at the end
of the task children were able to remove any of their pre-
viously provided answers. The autistic group showed evi-
dence of metacognitive monitoring difficulties, with
poorer confidence–accuracy calibration and smaller dif-
ference scores between their judgment of confidence rat-
ings for correct versus incorrect answers, compared to TD
children. The autistic participants also showed reduced
use of monitoring to control their reporting, with a sig-
nificantly smaller mean difference between judgment of
confidence ratings for kept and removed answers than
TD participants.
Findings from other studies are mixed. Sawyer et al.
[2014] used a similar design to examine metacognitive
monitoring and control on a facial emotion recognition
task and a general knowledge task. Overall, autistic and
TD adults did not differ on either task for the measures of
metacognitive monitoring (realism of confidence judg-
ments) or control (withholding incorrect responses and
volunteering correct responses; d0). Nevertheless, a high
proportion of autistic participants (40%; vs. 13.5% of TD
participants)—notably those who had shown diminished
metacognitive monitoring—chose not to withhold any
answers at all on the emotion recognition task, indicating
potential subtle underlying metacognitive control diffi-
culties [see Grainger et al., 2016, for further discussion].
Maras, Gamble, and Brosnan [2019] tested meta-
cognitive monitoring and control in autistic and TD chil-
dren on a Mathematics gaming task and also reported no
differences between groups in realism of confidence judg-
ments (although the autistic group did show a general
bias toward higher confidence). However, the autistic
children showed reduced cohesion between their pre-
and post-test intentions (e.g., pre-test they indicated that
their intention was to get the answer right, but post-test
they reported that they had meant to get it wrong), again
potentially indicating subtle difficulties in monitoring.
Furthermore, despite no significant difference between
groups on the measure of control (the number of points
won), there was a strong trend for reduced strategy use by
autistic participants, who averaged around half the num-
ber of points of the TD group when no support (such as
strategy reminders) was provided. Finally, Cherkaoui and
Gilbert [2017] reported that while autistic participants
were undiminished in predicting their (poorer) perfor-
mance on a prospective memory task, they failed to com-
pensate for this with an increased use of reminders
during the task. Thus, metacognitive monitoring is neces-
sary but not sufficient for effective strategy regulation;
even if autistic individuals’ metacognitive monitoring per
se is unimpaired, they may nevertheless experience diffi-
culties in using monitoring processes to strategically con-
trol their reporting [Sheppard, Bruineberg, Kretschmer-
Trendowicz, & Altgassen, 2018].
These mixed findings indicate further investigation of
metacognitive monitoring and control in autism is
warranted, specifically for the reporting of episodic events
(where autistic difficulties are often noted), especially
given the often important implications of such reports
for both every day and high stakes real-life situations
(e.g., providing eyewitness testimony). Autistic individ-
uals are more likely to have interactions with police as
victims/witnesses1 and may, therefore, be required to pro-
vide a detailed account of an incident [e.g., Brown-
Lavoie, Viecili, & Weiss, 2014; Weiss & Fardella,
2018]. However, evidence suggests that, compared with
TD individuals, autistic witnesses often provide testi-
mony that is less accurate and/or less complete [see
Maras, 2020; Maras & Bowler, 2014].
Research to date, however, has not considered the level
or “grain size” of detail provided by autistic witnesses
(e.g., whether the information reported is at the FG or
CG level), nor their ability to metacognitively monitor
and control their reporting decisions. Thus, we know lit-
tle about the informativeness of autistic witnesses’ mem-
ory reports, or about the underlying monitoring and
control processes. This is critical because the number of
1From here on the term “witness” is used throughout to encompass both
third party witnesses and victims who, through providing evidence in the
Criminal Justice System, become a witness.
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details reported is not necessarily indicative of how infor-
mative the testimony is; for example, to rule out all but
one of the suspects it may be critical to obtain the exact
color of the perpetrator’s jacket (e.g., brown), rather than
a broader response (e.g., dark). Understanding whether
differences in autistic and TD witnesses’ accuracy and
completeness are the result of differences in monitoring
and/or control processes is also crucial for developing
appropriate interview support [see Maras, 2020].
In examining performance by autistic people, it is also
important to consider how the task is delivered
(e.g., socially or online) and whether the underlying task
requirements (e.g., to maximize accuracy or informative-
ness, or both) are explicitly stated. Several researchers
have argued that autistic participants’ performance on
tasks is often under-estimated because social cognition
difficulties hinder their ability to infer the implicit
demands of the task [see e.g., Kenworthy, Yerys,
Anthony, & Wallace, 2008; White, 2013; White, Bur-
gess, & Hill, 2009]. For example, difficulties that are fre-
quently observed when instructions and questions are
administered socially often dissipate when more explicit
instructions are provided, or when computerized versions
of the task are used [e.g., Chevallier et al., 2014; Ozonoff,
1995]. Socially mediated tasks may also place greater sen-
sory and executive demands on autistic individuals. Hsu
and Teoh [2017] examined the impact of socially admin-
istered questions on event memory in autism by inter-
viewing autistic and TD children about an event that
they had participated in either a traditional face-to-face
format or via an avatar. There was some evidence that
the avatar elicited more information and higher accuracy
than the human interviewer for the autistic (but not the
TD) children. Hsu and Teoh suggested that the avatar
interviewer reduced demands on social processing and
minimized potential overloading of the sensory system,
allowing autistic children to attend more closely during
questioning, which in turn improved their episodic
recall. It has also been argued that autistic individuals
experience attenuated social motivation and diminished
concern for reputation management [see Chevallier,
Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012; but see Jaswal &
Akhtar, 2018]. Explicit instructions and computerized
task versions may, therefore, “level the playing field” by
being less overloading and ambiguous, and equally moti-
vating for both autistic and TD individuals.
TD witnesses, in contrast, often perform better in social
contexts. Although TD individuals can and do monitor
and control their reporting in terms of accuracy and
informativeness, they nevertheless show a tendency to
maximize informativeness over accuracy [e.g., Brewer,
Vagadia, Hope, & Gabbert, 2018; McCallum, Brewer, &
Weber, 2016]. This tendency is attenuated, however,
when they are required to read their responses aloud to
the experimenter compared to when their responses are
obtained in private [McCallum et al., 2016]. It has been
suggested that answering in a social context may moti-
vate TD participants to be more accurate to avoid embar-
rassment by reporting more accurate CG detail than risk
providing inaccurate FG information [McCallum et al.,
2016; but see Taylor & Dando, 2018]. Furthermore,
McCallum, Brewer, and Weber [2019] argue that wit-
nesses construe informativeness based not only on the
degree of specificity in their memories but also on their
perceptions of the value or utility of the information.
Thus, TD individuals are also more likely to report a
higher proportion of (more accurate) CG information
than they would otherwise report when they are
instructed that accuracy should be prioritized over infor-
mativeness [e.g., Goldsmith, Koriat, & Weinberg-Eliezer,
2002; Weber & Brewer, 2008].
The present study examined the role of metacognitive
monitoring and control processes in the informativeness
and accuracy of autistic and TDwitnesses’memory reports,
and the impact of task instructions and format (social or
online) on this. We predicted that autistic witnesses would
show difficulties with metacognitive monitoring and con-
trol, and therefore a greater tendency to report FG detail
with reduced accuracy compared to TD participants. When
the need for accuracy was made explicit, however, it was
predicted that both autistic and TD participants’ recall
accuracy would be improved (driven by a shift from FG to
CG responding), somewhat ameliorating the difference
between groups. We expected the format of the task to dif-
ferentially impact each group’s performance. Specifically,
we expected TD witnesses to perform better when ques-
tions were delivered socially, while difficulties with social
cognition and diminished motivation would impede autis-
tic participants’ performance when questions were deliv-
ered socially. We expected similar performance from both




A power analysis using G*Power3.1 [Faul et al., 2007] indi-
cated that a sample size of 60 would give 80% power to
detect medium-to-large effects of Group, Delivery, and
Phase (i.e., to have meaningful implications for practice). A
total of 63 participants took part: 30 autistic adults
(16 males, 14 females) and 33 TD participants (seven males;
26 females). Participants were recruited mainly from the
South West of England and surrounding areas, including
via previous research participation, autism-related and local
community Facebook groups, social and support groups, as
well as via local community recruitment (including posters,
magazine articles, and social media posts, and University
website campaigns).
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All autistic participants had received a formal clinical
diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder according to
DSM–IV [American Psychiatric Association, 2000] or
DSM-5 criteria [American Psychiatric Association, 2013],
and confirmed this with a copy of their clinical diagnos-
tic report (NB. a breakdown of scores from the ADOS was
only available for three participants). Six participants had
received a clinical diagnosis but were unable to access
their report and were therefore administered the Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Second Edition [ADOS-
2; Lord et al., 2012] to confirm their diagnoses. The total
ADOS scores for the nine participants who had scores
available were as follows: Communication M = 3.00,
SD = 1.41, range = 1–6; Reciprocal Social Interaction
M = 7.56, SD = 1.74, range = 6–11.
Autistic and TD participants were randomly assigned to
complete the study in either a social delivery condition
(where questions were delivered by the experimenter) or
online. There were no effects of Group, Delivery, or
Group × Delivery interactions for age (all Ps > 0.392,
ηP2s < 0.01), or on measures from the Wechsler Abbrevi-
ated Scale of Intelligence-Second Edition [WASI-II;
Wechsler, 2011]: Verbal Comprehension Index (all
Ps > 0.353, ηP2s < 0.02), Perceptual Reasoning Index (all
Ps > 0.124, ηP2s < 0.04), and full-scale IQ (all Ps > 0.136,
ηP2s < 0.04). All non-autistic participants scored below
the recommended minimum cut-off of 32 on the Autism
Spectrum Quotient [AQ-50, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001] and, as expected, the
autistic group scored significantly higher on the AQ than
TD participants (P < 0.001, ηP2 = 0.71), but there was no
main effect of Delivery (P = 0.666, ηP2 < 0.01), or Group ×
Delivery interaction (P = 0.337, ηP2 = 0.02) (see Table 1).
Participants provided their written informed consent to
take part and were fully debriefed. Ethical approval was
obtained from the Psychology Research Ethics Commit-
tee at the University of Bath.
Materials
Stimulus video. Participants viewed a short video clip
of a mock bank robbery lasting 36 s. The clip showed two
males taking cash from a female bank teller before run-
ning from the bank and leaving in a getaway car driven
by an accomplice [see also McCallum et al., 2016].
Recall questions. The recall questionnaire comprised
20 questions developed by McCallum et al. [2016] and
required either color, numerical, or time-based answers
(e.g., the color of the suspects’ clothing, number of wit-
nesses, age of the getaway car, duration of robbery, etc.;
see Appendices 1–3). Following each question, partici-
pants were asked to estimate their confidence that their
answer was correct on a sliding scale with 10% incre-
ments (i.e., 0%–100%).
Design and Procedure
The study used a 2 (Group: autistic, TD) × 2 (Delivery:
social, online) × 3 (Phase: Phase 1 free report, Phase 2 forced
report, Phase 3 instructions to maximize accuracy) mixed
design, where Phase was within participants. Participants
were tested individually. They were informed that they
were about to view a stimulus video (alone and in a sepa-
rate room) and that they would be asked some questions
about it afterward. Half of the participants received the
questions socially (by the experimenter); the other half
completed the questions online in a separate room. In
the social condition, a female experimenter provided
instructions for the task and presented the questions. Fol-
lowing Chevallier et al. [2014], in the non-social condi-
tion, both task instructions and the test questions were
presented online, with the experimenter not present in
the room. Approximate task duration did not differ
between Delivery conditions, F(1,59) = 1.37, P = 0.247,
ηP2 = 0.02, or Group, F(1,59) = 0.22, P = 0.643, ηP2 = 0.01,
and there was no significant Delivery × Group
interaction = F(1,59) = 1.21, P = 0.277, ηP2 = 0.02.
Participants completed the memory questionnaire on
three consecutive occasions. We developed a three-phase
paradigm, adapted from Brewer et al. [2018]; see also
McCallum et al., [2016]. In Phase 1, participants freely
generated the granularity of their responses to each ques-
tion (i.e., FG or CG) without any instructions about grain
Table 1. Mean and Range Age, IQ, and AQ-50 Scores for Autistic and TD Participants Within Each Delivery Condition (SDs are in
parentheses)
TD Autistic
Social (n = 15) Online (n = 15) Social (n = 18) Online (n = 15)
Age (years) 33.67 (10.93); range 18–51 35.93 (12.63); range 19–60 34.53 (14.55); range 18–59 31.33 (12.14); range 19–62
Verbal Comprehension
Index
110.33 (5.57); range 102–125 107.00 (11.44); range 79–123 106.40 (9.33); range 90–121 106.27 (12.44); range 85–128
Perceptual Reasoning
Index
112.11 (11.89); range 93–136 110.40 (11.35); range 92–135 108.73 (14.47); range 82–131 103.73 (13.24); range (82–128)
Full-scale IQ 112.67 (7.60); range 101–125 109.80 (10.67); range 88–132 108.53 (12.05); range 89–129 105.67 (12.86); range 86–132
AQ-50 12.94 (6.89); range 1–24 10.20 (5.28); range 2–17 34.29 (10.12); range 14–46 35.33 (7.94); range 21–46
Gender 3 males, 15 females 4 males, 11 females 8 males, 7 females 8 males, 7 females
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size. In Phase 2, participants answered the same ques-
tions again but this time they were instructed to provide
both an FG and a CG answer to each question (“forced
report”), in a counterbalanced order. For example, when
asked how many witnesses were in the bank, participants
were asked to provide both an exact number (e.g., 3) and
a range estimate (e.g., between 2 and 4). This allowed an
examination of whether witnesses’ reporting choices
under the previous free report phase reflected the most
accurate grain size available in their memory. Finally, in
Phase 3, participants were asked to select one of their
Phase 2 answers as their final answer. They were
instructed to prioritize accuracy over level of detail by
reporting CG options unless they were certain the FG
detail was correct. In each phase, participants were not
able to proceed to the next question without providing
an answer to each question. They were instructed that if
they were not sure or could not remember any of the
answers to give their best answer, and not to say/type “do
not know” or “cannot remember.” Participants provided
judgments of confidence about the accuracy of each of
their responses (0% very very unsure to 100% very
very sure).
Coding
Responses were coded by two independent raters for
accuracy (correct or incorrect) and grain size (FG or CG).
Following Weber and Brewer [2008], specific responses
(e.g., sky blue; gray) were coded as FG while broader
responses such as “dark” were coded as CG. Answers
which included a phrase that suggested estimation, but
ultimately included an FG response were coded as FG
(e.g., “about/around 30 seconds” = 30 s, “grayish” = gray).
Answers indirectly specifying a range were coded as CG
(e.g., “20 seconds or under” = 0–20 s; “at least two but
there could have been a third” = 2-3, i.e., interpreted as a
range), and ranges of 0 were coded as missing data
(e.g., “2-2”). Answers referring to the age of the car such
as “very old” or “vintage old model” and those referring
to an era (e.g., “1950s?”) were coded as CG. Color
answers such as “multicolor” or “stripey” were coded as
CG. Vague quantity-related answers (e.g., “quite/lots/sev-
eral”) and “do not know” responses were all coded as
missing data. Where a participant gave two responses
(e.g., “very dark/black,” “dark, almost black,” “brown or
white,” or “late 1970s, maybe 1975?”), if they were two
FG answers, the first answer was coded, and if they gave
one FG and one CG response, the answer was coded as
FG. In Phase 1, 25 items (1.98% of 1260 items) across
seven participants were coded as missing data; in Phase
2, 18 items (0.71% of 2,520 items) across six participants
were coded as missing; in Phase 3 one item was coded as
missing (0.08% of 1,260 items). Strong agreement was
reached between the two raters, with intraclass
correlation coefficients of 0.99 for categorizing details as
FG, 0.96 for categorizing CG details, and 0.98 for scoring
accuracy (correct or incorrect).
Results
Reporting Informativeness
Informativeness scores for Phases 1 and 3 were calculated
by dividing the number of FG details by the total number
of details reported in that phase (i.e., FG/(FG + CG)). A
2 (Group: autistic, TD) × 2 (Delivery: social, online) × 2
(Phase: Phase 1 free report, Phase 3 instructions to maximize
accuracy) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was con-
ducted with informativeness scores as the dependent
variable. There was a main effect of Phase, with in-
formativeness significantly dropping from Phase 1 to
3, F(1, 59) = 624.94, P < 0.001, ηP2 = 0.91. Both groups
demonstrated a strong preference for reporting FG details
in Phase 1 (M informativeness = 0.94, SD = 0.09), which
shifted to a preference for reporting more CG details in
Phase 3 (M informativeness = 0.34, SD = 0.18). There was
no effect of Group, F(1, 59) = 0.26, P = 0.612, ηP2 = 0.004,
Delivery, F(1, 59) = 0.24, P = 0.630, ηP2 = 0.004, or Group
× Delivery, F(1, 59) = 0.03, P = 0.872, ηP2 < 0.001, Group
× Phase, F(1, 59) = 3.20, P = 0.079, ηP2 = 0.05, Delivery ×
Phase, F(1, 59) = 0.02, P = 0.888, ηP2 < 0.001, or Group ×
Delivery × Phase interactions, F(1, 59) = 1.28, P = 0.262,
ηP2 = 0.02. That is, both groups showed a similar bias
toward FG reporting, and the instructions to maximize
accuracy had a similar effect in increasing CG reporting
(reducing the informativeness of responses) for both
groups, regardless of task delivery mode (i.e., social
vs. online).
Reporting Accuracy
Accuracy scores within each phase were calculated by the
number of correct details as a function of total details
reported (overall, and for FG and CG details separately). A
series of Group × Delivery × Phase mixed ANOVAs were
then conducted to examine whether autistic and TD wit-
nesses differed in their spontaneous grain size reporting
strategy and the impact of task instructions and delivery.2
Strategic control under free report (phase 1 vs.
phase 2). To examine whether autistic and TD partici-
pants differed in the effectiveness of their spontaneous
grain size reporting strategy, overall accuracy scores in
Phase 1 were compared with accuracy scores for FG and
CG details in Phase 2 in two separate 2 (Group: autistic,
TD) × 2 (Delivery: social, online) × 2 (Phase: Phase 1 free
report, Phase 2 forced report) mixed ANOVAs for Phase
2Separate ANOVAs, rather than a single omnibus ANOVA, were conducted
because in Phase 2 respondents provided both FG and CG answers.
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2 FG and Phase 2 CG accuracy, respectively. The first
ANOVA indicated that Phase 1 overall accuracy was sig-
nificantly higher than Phase 2 FG accuracy, F
(1, 59) = 4.37, P = 0.041, ηP2 = 0.07. There were no other
main effects or interactions (all Ps > 0.095, ηP2s < 0.05).
The second ANOVA indicated that Phase 1 overall
accuracy was significantly lower than Phase 2 CG accu-
racy, F(1, 59) = 76.47, P < 0.001, ηP2 = 0.56. There was
also a main effect of Delivery, F(1, 59) = 8.02, P = 0.006,
ηP2 = 0.12, whereby accuracy was significantly higher
when the task was delivered socially compared to online.
No other main effects or interactions were significant
(Ps > 0.281, ηP2s < 0.02).
Thus, participants were exercising some grain size con-
trol (with more accurate free responses in Phase 1 than
their forced FG responses in Phase 2). However, their
Phase 1 responses were less accurate than their Phase
2 CG responses, indicating less than optimal control. The
absence of group effects indicates that this was the case
for both autistic and TD witnesses.
Effect of instructions versus spontaneous reporting
(phase 1 vs. phase 3). To examine the effect of instruc-
tions to maximize accuracy over informativeness com-
pared to participants’ spontaneous free reporting in
Phase 1, a 2 (Group: autistic, TD) × 2 (Delivery: social,
online) × 2 (Phase: Phase 1 free report, Phase 3 instructions
to maximize accuracy) mixed ANOVA for overall accuracy
was conducted. There was a main effect of Delivery, F
(1, 59) = 7.72, P = 0.007, ηP2 = 0.12, with higher accu-
racy for social (M = 0.52, SD = 0.10) compared to online
delivery (M = 0.41, SD = 0.15). Accuracy was also signifi-
cantly higher in Phase 3 (M = 0.56, SD = 0.12) compared
to baseline free reporting in Phase 1 (M = 0.44, SD = 0.13),
F(1, 59) = 44.39, P < 0.001, ηP2 = 0.43. There was no
effect of Group, F(1, 59) = 0.03, P = 0.862, ηP2 = 0.001,
or Group × Delivery, F(1, 59) = 1.67, P = 0.202, ηP2 = 0.03,
Group × Phase, F(1, 59) = 0.30, P = 0.589, ηP2 = 0.01,
Delivery × Phase, F(1, 59) = 0.46, P = 0.503, ηP2 = 0.01,
or Group × Delivery × Phase interactions, F
(1, 59) = 0.02, P = 0.880, ηP2 < 0.001. These data are dis-
played in Figure 1.
Thus, social question delivery and instructions to maxi-
mize accuracy were beneficial for both autistic and TD
witnesses’ accuracy.3
Effect of instructions versus optimal reporting
(phase 2 vs. phase 3). Two 2 (Group: autistic, TD) × 2
(Delivery: social, online) × 2 (Phase: Phase 2 forced report,
Phase 3 instructions to maximize accuracy) mixed ANOVAs
were conducted, comparing Phase 3 overall accuracy with
Phase 2 FG and Phase 2 CG accuracy, respectively. The
first ANOVA with Phase 2 FG details indicated a main
effect of Delivery, with overall accuracy higher in the
social than the online condition, F(1, 59) = 5.53,
P = 0.022, ηP2 = 0.09. There was also a main effect of
Phase, with significantly higher overall accuracy in Phase
3 compared to Phase 2 FG responses, F(1,59) = 92.47,
P < 0.001, ηP2 = 0.61 (Fig. 1). No other main effects or
interactions were significant (all Ps > 0.173, ηP2s < 0.03).
The second ANOVA with Phase 2 CG accuracy again
showed a significant effect of Delivery with higher accu-
racy when the task was delivered socially compared to
online, F(1, 59) = 8.81, P = 0.004, ηP2 = 0.13. Phase 3 over-
all accuracy was again significantly lower than Phase
2 CG accuracy, F(1,59) = 23.02, P < 0.001, ηP2 = 0.28. No
other main effects or interactions were significant (all
Ps > 0.051, ηP2s < 0.06).
Thus, both autistic and TD participants’ accuracy was
improved with the provision of instructions to maximize
accuracy over informativeness and when questions were
delivered socially, but grain size regulation was neverthe-
less still suboptimal for both groups. These data are dis-
played in Figure 1.
Metacognitive Monitoring
Confidence in accurate vs. inaccurate responses.
Metacognitive judgment accuracy was assessed through a
series of 2 (Group: autistic, TD) × 2 (Delivery: social,
online) × 2 (Accuracy: accurate, inaccurate) mixed
Figure 1. Accuracy at each Phase by Delivery condition for autistic and TD witnesses (error bars represent standard error of the
means).
3It is worth noting, however, that a subsidiary analysis of confidence–
accuracy with Phase 3 FG data nevertheless suggested that both groups
found it hard to follow this instruction, with 88% of items reported at FG
being rated at 90% or less confidence.
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ANOVAs with judgment of confidence ratings as the
dependent variable for Phases 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
There was a main effect of Accuracy, with significantly
higher confidence for accurate than inaccurate answers
(all Ps < 0.001, ηP2s > 0.48). There were no significant
effects of Group (all Ps > 0.466, ηP2s < 0.01), Delivery (all
Ps > 0.223, ηP2s < 0.03), or interaction effects (Ps > 0.095,
ηP2s < 0.05). The mean number of correct and incorrect
responses, and participants’ mean confidence in these
responses, are displayed in Table 2.
Confidence–accuracy calibration. Figure 2 displays
confidence–accuracy calibration curves for autistic and TD
witnesses, representing the overall correspondence
between their assessed and actual probabilities of being
correct in each phase (with separate curves for FG and CG
details in Phase 2). All curves display a generally positive
relationship, indicative of confidence and accuracy being
calibrated for both groups. However, for both groups,
there was a sharp drop from around 90% accuracy at
100% confidence under free report in Phase 1, to around
70% accuracy at 100% confidence and 45% accuracy at
90% confidence when participants were forced to provide
FG responses in Phase 2. In other words, rather than sim-
ply lowering their judgments of confidence when pres-
sured to provide (inaccurate) FG responses, participants
instead reported inaccurate items with high confidence,
indicating that confidence is less diagnostic under condi-
tions where witnesses feel pressured to be informative.
Gamma analyses. Kruskal–Goodman Gamma correla-
tions [see Nelson, 1984] were calculated for each individual
participant between the assessed probability correct for
each answer and whether or not the answer actually was
correct (i.e., the total number of accurate and inaccurate
responses at each level of confidence: i.e., 0%–100% at 10%
increments). Gamma correlations range between +1 and
−1, with a score of 0 indicating chance-level accuracy. A
large positive gamma value indicates high correspondence
between confidence in the correctness of one’s answers and
their actual correctness, while a large negative value indi-
cates that confidence judgments were contrariwise to recall
performance (i.e., below chance performance).
Gamma scores could not be calculated for one participant
in Phase 3 as they did not report a large enough range of con-
fidence choices, and tests of normal distribution revealed an
outlier in the TD group. These cases were removed and a
series of one-sample t-tests within each Group, Delivery, and
Phase combination indicated that gamma scoreswere signifi-
cantly greater than chance (i.e., 0) across all conditions (all
Ps < 0.002, ds > 1.04). A 2 (Group) × 2 (Delivery) × 3 (Phase)
mixed ANOVA was then conducted with Gamma scores as
the dependent variable. There were no effects of Group,
F(1,57) = 0.36, P = 0.552, ηP2 = 0.01, Delivery, F(1,57) = 0.02,
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P = 0.081, ηP2 = 0.05, Group × Phase, F(2, 114) = 1.05,
P = 0.353, ηP2 = 0.02, Delivery × Phase, F(2, 114) = 0.73,
P = 0.484, ηP2 = 0.01, or Group × Delivery × Phase interac-
tions, F(2,114) = 0.34, P = 0.715, ηP2 = 0.01. (Table 3).
Metacognitive Control
Following Grainger et al. [2016] and Sawyer et al. [2014],
d-prime (d0) was calculated using participants’ hit rates
(HR) and false alarm rates (FAR) to examine strategic con-
trol effectiveness. HR was the number of hits (correct
Phase 2 FG responses that were put forward in Phase 3)
plus the number of correct rejections (CG responses that
were put forward in Phase 3 where Phase 2 FG responses
were incorrect), divided by the total number of responses.
FAR was the number of false alarms (incorrect Phase 2 FG
responses that were put forward in Phase 3) plus the num-
ber of misses (CG responses put forward in Phase 3 where
Phase 2 FG responses had been correct), divided by the
total number of responses. d0 was then calculated as the
difference between HR and FAR. A d0 score of 0 indicates
no difference between HR and FAR and thus ineffective
control, while d0 scores significantly above 0 indicate
higher HRs than FARs and thus effective control over
reporting decisions. A 2 (Group) × 2 (Delivery) ANOVA
Figure 2. Confidence–accuracy calibration curves for autistic and TD witnesses within each Phase. The frequency of judgments in each
confidence category is presented with each data point.
Table 3. Mean Gamma Coefficients for Autistic and TD Witnesses Within Social and Online Delivery Conditions (SDs are in
Parentheses)
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Social delivery Online delivery Social delivery Online delivery Social delivery Online delivery
Autistic 0.40 (0.29) 0.57 (0.20) 0.38 (0.16) 0.41 (0.23) 0.31 (0.24) 0.38 (0.36)










Figure 3. d0 scores (metacognitive control over reporting) for
autistic and TD participants in social and online delivery condi-
tions (error bars reflect standard error of the mean).
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with d0 as the dependent variable indicated no significant
main effects of Group, F(1, 58) = 0.21, P = 0.651,
ηP2 = 0.004, or Delivery, F(1, 58) = 0.77, P = 0.384,
ηP2 = 0.01, but a significant Group × Delivery interaction,
F(1, 58) = 7.96, P = 0.007, ηP2 = 0.12. As shown in Figure 3,
TD witnesses demonstrated significantly better reporting
control than autistic witnesses under social delivery
(P = 0.003), but there was no significant difference
between groups when using online delivery (P = 0.195).
Discussion
Although autistic individuals have been reported to show
subtle difficulties in monitoring and/or controlling their
reporting accuracy [e.g., Brosnan et al., 2016; Cherkaoui &
Gilbert, 2017; Grainger et al., 2014, 2016; Williams et al.,
2018], this has not been previously examined in the con-
text of episodic memory. This gap is important because
diminished monitoring and control processes may contrib-
ute to the often-reported difficulties in episodic event mem-
ory in autism [e.g., when providing an eyewitness account;
see Maras, 2020]. Contrary to predictions, autistic witnesses
did not show impaired metacognitive monitoring or con-
trol relative to TD witnesses. Indeed, both autistic and TD
witnesses showed a similarly strong preference for reporting
(less accurate) FG detail under free report conditions, and
both groups benefitted from explicit task instructions with
improved (although still suboptimal) accuracy when
instructed to maximize accuracy over informativeness.
There was, however, one important caveat: while delivering
the questions socially improved overall accuracy rates for
both groups compared to online delivery, the autistic group
nevertheless showed poorer metacognitive control in their
reporting decisions compared to TD witnesses under social,
but not online, reporting conditions.
At first glance, the undiminished episodic memory
demonstrated by autistic participants in the current study
is surprising, given the substantial existing literature
documenting episodic memory impairments in this
group [see e.g., Boucher et al., 2012; Boucher & Bowler,
2008]. However, memory difficulties in autism are not
pervasive (particularly in individuals of average or above
average levels of intelligence) and tend to depend on the
nature of the task. Specifically, autistic people’s difficul-
ties are particularly marked on tests requiring a free narra-
tive account [e.g., Bowler, Gaigg, & Gardiner, 2008;
Bowler, Matthews, & Gardiner, 1997], while differences
between groups often diminish once tests of cued recall
or recognition are used [e.g., Almeida, Lamb, & Weisblatt,
2019; Bowler et al., 1997, 2008; see also Maras,
2020]. Such findings have led Bowler and colleagues to
propose the task support hypothesis [Bowler et al., 1997;
Bowler et al., 2004], which posits that memory perfor-
mance in autism is improved on tasks that provide more
support for the to-be-remembered material at test. Thus,
the structured paradigm used in the present study might
explain the observed intact reporting accuracy of autistic
participants. Findings also suggest that the task support
hypothesis may further apply to metacognitive processes,
in line with previous findings that autistic individuals are
able to monitor and regulate their performance strategies
when external cues to aid recall are available to them [e.-
g., Farrant, Boucher, & Blades, 1999; see also Sawyer
et al., 2014].
We used cued recall questions in order to generate spe-
cific responses that were readily codable for grain size in
an objective and comparable way between participants,
in line with previous grain size research with TD wit-
nesses [e.g., McCallum et al., 2016, 2019; Weber &
Brewer, 2008]. However, it is important for future
research to extend these findings using more
unsupported tests (such as a free narrative account) to
confirm the absence of difficulties in metacognitive mon-
itoring and control by autistic people in episodic memory
reporting. A potential approach to this might be to gener-
ate a free narrative account from participants in Phase
1 before presenting their account back to them in Phase
2 and obtaining judgments of confidence for each unit of
information reported (coding these, where possible, for
grain size). Brewer et al. [2018] examined grain size
reporting across tests of both free recall and cued recall
with TD witnesses and found they rarely reported CG
details under open-ended interview conditions, but they
did so under cued recall forced-report conditions. That is,
the cued recall forced-report procedure provided a means
by which accessible, but otherwise unreported, CG infor-
mation was provided. Thus, a free recall paradigm may
provide a more sensitive measure of participants’ sponta-
neous grain size control and may be more likely to reveal
any latent differences between autistic and TD groups.
As an aside, it is worth noting that both autistic and
TD witnesses’ accuracy was only around 75% at the 90%–
100% confidence level when they were forced to provide
FG responses in Phase 2, which is inconsistent with the
high free report confidence–accuracy observed in Phase
1, and with Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher’s [2018] view that
accuracy for very high confidence (i.e., 90%–100%)
responses is extremely high. Thus, when under pressure,
autistic and TD witnesses appear to produce a greater pro-
portion of inaccurate items at high confidence, indicating
that confidence is less diagnostic of accuracy when wit-
nesses are pressured to be informative [see also Brewer
et al., 2018]. Here the pressure was explicit, but of course,
in actual police investigations, contextual factors could
lead to witnesses perceiving a need to be informative.
The instruction to maximize accuracy over informa-
tiveness improved both autistic and TD witnesses’
reporting accuracy similarly and substantially. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that participants underwent an
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interim forced report procedure to access both FG and
CG detail accuracy in Phase 2. We cannot rule out the
possibility that the explicit instructions to generate a CG
response in Phase 2 increased the perceived appropriate-
ness of this option to drive the greater CG responding in
Phase 3. Alternatively, the process of having previously
generated both FG and CG responses may alter the way
participants retrieve and evaluate candidate responses in
the subsequent phase [Sauer & Hope, 2016]. Notwith-
standing this, that the autistic group also apparently
benefited from the explicit instruction to prioritize accu-
racy is consistent with the contention that autistic indi-
viduals’ performance is more impaired the greater
the degree of open-endedness of the test situation
[e.g., Ciesielski & Harris, 1997; Van Eylen et al., 2011;
White, 2013; White et al., 2009], and has implications for
the instructions they receive about the importance of
accuracy when providing eyewitness testimony.
Witnesses were more accurate in their recall when
questions were delivered socially rather than online. This
increase in accuracy was not accompanied by a reduction
in informativeness, indicating that other processes, such
as increased motivation and feelings of accountability,
were involved [e.g., McCallum et al., 2016; Van-
dierendonck & Van Damme, 1988; but see Taylor &
Dando, 2018]. That the social condition improved accu-
racy rates similarly for autistic and TD witnesses is in con-
trast to the view that autism is marked by diminished
social motivation [Chevallier et al., 2012] and is more in
line with recent suggestions that autistic people are
socially motivated, but that social-cognitive difficulties
can limit their ability to read and respond appropriately
to social cues [see e.g., Hull et al., 2017; Jaswal & Akhtar,
2018; Livingston, Shah, & Happé, 2018]. Indeed, despite
this improvement in overall accuracy, the autistic group
showed poorer reporting control than TD witnesses in
the social condition, but this difference between groups
dissipated when the task was delivered online. Thus, it
seems that while autistic participants may be as moti-
vated as TD participants to enhance their accuracy under
social reporting conditions, underlying social-cognitive
difficulties may over-burden autistic individuals’ execu-
tive resources in contexts involving social interaction,
limiting their ability to make optimal reporting decisions
[see also Dichter & Belger, 2007].
The current study has a number of important practical
implications for obtaining eyewitness testimony from
autistic individuals. First, findings highlight that autistic
witnesses can provide as detailed and accurate testimony
as non-autistic witnesses when specific and cued ques-
tions are used [see Maras, 2020, for a detailed discussion
of the implications of this for practice]. Second, autistic
witnesses showed a similarly strong tendency as TD wit-
nesses to report more FG detail (at the expense of accu-
racy), but both groups shifted toward reporting more
accurate but coarser-grained information when instructed
to do so. Thus, when deciding on an appropriate
questioning strategy to elicit an eyewitness account, investi-
gators need to determine whether greater potential investi-
gative leads (i.e., FG but potentially less accurate
information) or preserving the integrity of the information
that is reported (i.e., with more accurate but CG detail) is
more important. Third, while both groups were more accu-
rate in their recall of events when questions were delivered
socially, the autistic group showed a subtle impairment in
reporting control under this condition, indicating that
social situations may be motivating but nevertheless more
cognitively burdensome for autistic witnesses. Further
research is needed using different reporting conditions, but
tentatively this finding suggests that interview situations,
which are fundamentally social (e.g., where questions are
delivered by an interviewer) but in which social complexi-
ties and ambiguities have been minimized (e.g., avoiding
the pressure for eye contact, using more direct language,
etc.) may optimize recall from autistic witnesses [see also
Hsu & Teoh, 2017]. Finally, the finding that both autistic
and TD witnesses produced a greater proportion of inaccu-
rate items at high confidence under forced-report condi-
tions highlights the importance of minimizing investigator
pressure and explicitly offering the option for witnesses to
say if they “do not know” or “cannot remember” [see
Bull, 2010).
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the
current study. We cannot rule out the possibility that
null effects such as the lack of between-group differences
in reporting accuracy were due to insufficient power to
detect smaller effects. However, all effect sizes for
between-groups comparisons were very small (all
ηP2s < 0.01), suggesting that any group differences in this
regard were unlikely to be meaningful on a practical level.
It is also worth reiterating that the absence of group dif-
ferences can be readily accounted for by the structured
nature of the task with specific cued questions, which
likely offered sufficient task support to diminish episodic
memory differences between groups (see Bowler et al.,
1997, Bowler et al., 2004). It is a further limitation that,
although the participants in the current study were mat-
ched on age and IQ, it was not possible to match groups
on sex, which may be pertinent given that some sex dif-
ferences have been reported in episodic memory (see
Herlitz & Rehnman, 2008]. When sex differences are
found, however, they tend to favor females (Herlitz &
Rehnman, 2008]. Since the autistic group in the current
study comprised a greater ratio of males to females this
should, if anything, have made detection of autistic
impairment more likely, yet no such differences were
found.
To conclude, to our knowledge, this is the first study to
explore metacognitive monitoring and control processes
surrounding confidence in episodic memories in an
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eyewitness testimony context. We found no evidence of
autistic impairment in episodic memory or metacognitive
monitoring and control processes overall. However, social
delivery of the task appeared to negatively impact autistic
witnesses’ ability to optimally control their reporting
decisions in terms of withholding details that were incor-
rect and putting forward accurate details at the finest
level of grain size available in memory. These difficulties
were not present when the task was delivered online.
Future research should extend these findings using free
recall rather than cued questions. Findings have practical
implications for the reliability of autistic eyewitness evi-
dence and the format in which they are questioned.
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